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ABSTRACT: One of the basic metatheoretical premises of pragma-dialectics is that “Argumentation has 
the general function of managing the resolution of disagreement.” (p.277)  From a Peircean perspective this 
is at best a partial truth. While it may be correct that in concrete, finite contexts, argumentation may 
function to manage the resolution of disagreement, in the long run argumentation will tend towards the 
Truth (in a Peircean pragmatic sense). 
 Using Peirce as my compass, I will take argumentation to refer to the resolution function of 
thought contingently situated and finitely understood (aimed at the settlement of belief). I will take 
argument to mean any structure or process which can serve as a real, compelling constraint upon thought in 
general. I will show that while the particular function of argumentation may be managing the resolution of 
disagreement, when situated within a Peircean-styled realism (where the universe has the form of an 
argument), argumentation will tend in the long run toward the Truth (as the end of argumentation in 
general). I will end by showing that while argumentation may have a resolution function, its real measure 
and normative standard is growth (epistemic, moral, political and otherwise) rather than resolution per se. 
 
KEYWORDS: argument, argumentation, belief, evolution, growth, logic, Peirce, reality, reason, hope.  
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This is work within the theory of argumentation. One of the principal aims of this paper is 
to outline a comprehensive framework, a theoretical map of sorts, to help orient the 
construction of a comprehensive theory of argumentation. As a result, the scope of this 
paper is very broad, its aims extremely ambitious, perhaps problematically so. A second, 
lesser aim of this paper is to introduce others to the sometimes difficult, but incredibly 
rich vein of work that has been done by C.S. Peirce in the general theory of 
argumentation. I hope to make clear that what Peirce calls his theory of logic can be 
translated, using more contemporary parlance, as a theory of argumentation in a general 
and comprehensive sense. To this end, I will sketch a portrait of Peirce’s thought that 
may challenge some of the more conventional understandings and caricatures of Peirce’s 
work. As a final warning it should be noted that this paper is dense, one hopes that its 
author is less so. 
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1.0 PEIRCEAN LOGIC 
 
In his classification of the sciences1, Peirce positions Philosophy in between Mathematics 
and Idioscopy as a “Science of Discovery.” Mathematics aims at discovering “what is 
and what is not logically possible, without making itself responsible for its actual 
existence.” While Mathematics is indifferent to actual existence, Philosophy is a 
“positive science, in the sense of discovering what really is true; but it limits itself to so 
much truth as can be inferred from common experience.” It follows that the more 
particular and novel facts of reality are the proper domain of the more specialized 
sciences of Idioscopy. (Peirce 1903f, pp. 258-259)  
 As a positive science of discovery, Philosophy itself has three divisions: A) 
Phenomenology, B) Normative Science, and C) Metaphysics.  
 
Phenomenology ascertains and studies the kinds of elements universally present in the 
phenomenon; meaning by phenomenon, whatever is present at any time to the mind in any way. 
Normative science distinguishes what ought to be from what ought not to be, and makes other 
divisions and arrangements subservient to its primary dualistic distinction. Metaphysics seeks to 
give an account of the universe of mind and matter. Normative science rests largely on 
phenomenology and on mathematics; metaphysics on phenomenology and on normative science. 
(Peirce 1903f, p. 259) 
 
Normative Science itself “has three widely separated divisions: (i) Esthetics; (ii) Ethics; 
(iii) Logic.”   
 
Logic is the theory of self-controlled, or deliberate, thought; and as such, must appeal to ethics for 
its principles. It also depends upon phenomenology and upon mathematics. All thought being 
performed by means of signs, Logic may be regarded as the science of the general laws of signs. It 
has three branches: (1) Speculative Grammar, or the general theory of the nature and meaning of 
signs, whether they be icons, indices, or symbols; (2) Critic, which classifies arguments and 
determines the validity and degree of force of each kind; (3) Methodeutic, which studies the 
methods that ought to be pursued in the investigation, in the exposition, and in the application of 
truth. Each division depends on that which precedes it. (Peirce 1903f, p. 260) 
 
From Peirce’s account of Logic we discern the following: 1) Logic, as a division of 
Philosophy, is a positive normative science whose proper function is to distinguish what 
really or truly ought to be from what ought not to be with respect to self-controlled or 
deliberate thought. 2) As a positive normative science, logic aims to discover what ought 
and ought not to be for thought in general (where thought is itself to be understood as a 
real feature of the world). 3) Since all thought must have the structure of a sign, then 
Logic may also be defined as the science of the general laws of signs, i.e., semiosis. 4) 
Logic itself has three divisions or aspects: a) as speculative grammar it entails the study 
of signs in general, b) as critic it entails the classification of arguments (as real or natural 
kinds with respect to thought) and an accounting of the validity and force of each 
argument kind, and c) as methodeutic it stands as the method for selecting or determining 
                                                            
1 Incidentally, for Peirce, all sciences are either: A) Science of Discovery, B) Science of Review, or C) 
Practical Science. Since classification is itself part of the Science of Review, then Peirce’s present 
classification is not an arbitrary or ad hoc construction, but the result of a previous process of Discovery. 
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the method or methods that ought to be employed with respect to the ends proper to 
deliberate or self-controlled thought. I will now discuss each of these in turn. 
 
1.1 LOGIC AND REALITY 
 
Insofar as logic is a division of philosophy, and thus a positive science, its principal or 
primary function is to distinguish what really or truly ought to be from what ought not to 
be for self-controlled or deliberate thought. In other words, logic aims at distinguishing 
what deliberate, self-controlled thought2 ought to think from what it ought not to think 
(as that which is worthy of critical assent in a real or truthful sense). This amounts to 
saying that logic deals with distinguishing propositions, argumentations, theories, etc. 
that ought to be believed, affirmed, etc. from those that ought not to be believed, 
affirmed, and so on. Since thought does not contain the conditions for determining what 
ought and ought not to be entirely within itself, then it must have reference to something 
that is distinct or independent from thought. This thought-independent reference point is 
what Peirce refers to as reality. Reality is simply that which is what it is independent of 
contingently situated thought. (Peirce 1971, pp. 88-90) So defined, reality is a purely 
logical notion, a logical axiom (and so not yet part of any metaphysics). Peirce himself 
asserts that the “axiom that real things exist” is “the fundamental axiom of logic, for it 
amounts to the claim “that every intelligible question whatever is susceptible in its own 
nature to receiving a definitive and satisfactory answer, if it be sufficiently investigated 
by observation and reasoning.”3 (Peirce 1883-84, pp. 216-217) 
                                                           
 
1.2 LOGIC AND THOUGHT IN GENERAL 
 
A theory of logic in general (or logical theory) ought to function at the level of thought in 
general. While psychological, anthropological and other finite facts may have some 
relevance to logical theory, (e.g., establishing the most effective means of communication 
in a particular context), logical theory in its most general sense ought to be concerned 
with distinguishing what ought to be from what ought not to be for thought in its most 
general sense. 
 
Logic is the science of thought, not merely of thought as a psychical phenomenon but of thought 
in general, its general laws and kinds. (Peirce 1898, p. 36) 
 
Thus, logically speaking, the category thought in general need not entail any actual 
thinking here and now (hic et nunc), but need only refer to conditions governing what 
ought or ought not to be assented to at the level of thought in general, i.e., what would-be 
or should-be thought by any possible thinker. (Peirce 1911, p. 455) Hence questions 
regarding such things as the function and validity of various forms of argument must be 
addressed from the point of view of thought in general “covering all rational life” (Peirce 
 
2 For Peirce, “logic stops where self-control stops.” (Peirce 1903d, p. 207) 
3 Peirce goes on to note “that any man who proposed to go on any other principle as a maxim of reasoning 
would be as insane as Gauss, Lobachewsky, Riemann or Helmholts would hold that geodesist to be who 
should think that he could detect any departure from the accepted laws of geometry, in any triangle 
measured on this earth.” (Peirce 1883-84, p. 217) 
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1905a, p. 337), and not from any more restricted anthropological or psychological point 
of view. 
 
Logic does rest on certain facts of experience among which are facts about men, but not upon any 
theory about the human mind or any theory to explain facts. (Peirce 1903c, p. 189) 
 
(I will have more to say about the importance of evaluating argument forms from a broad 
perspective “covering all rational life” in section 4.0) 
 
1.3 LOGIC AS SEMIOSIS 
 
Logic aims to distinguish what ought to be from what ought not to be really or truly for 
thought in general. Thought in its proper, logical sense is one with what we call law. Law 
in this logical sense is something general or something that is generally true of particular 
factualities. What we call thoughts are expressions or instantiations of thought in general 
(in a logical, not a metaphysical sense).  
 
Thoughts are neither qualities nor facts. They are not qualities because they can be produced and 
grow, while a quality is eternal, independent of time and of any realization. Besides, thoughts may 
have reasons, and indeed, must have some reasons, good or bad… A thought then is not a quality. 
No more is it a fact. For a thought is general. I had it. I imparted it to you. It is general on that side. 
It is also general in referring to all possible things, and not merely to those which happen to exist. 
No collection of facts can constitute a law; for the law goes beyond any accomplished facts and 
determines how facts that may be, but all of which never can have happened, shall be 
characterized. There is no objection to saying that a law is a general fact, provided it be understood 
that the general has an admixture of potentiality in it, so that no congeries of actions here and now 
can ever make a general fact. (Peirce CP I. 420) 
 
Thought is the bringing together of fact and quality (subject and predicate) in a way that 
“recognizes that they are together.” (Peirce CP I.485) More explicitly, thought is that 
which brings fact and quality (subject and predicate) together in a way that is reasonable, 
that is, that so relates a fact and a quality (subject and predicate) as to stand as the reason 
(or, expressed epistemically, the explanation) for their being so related. Expressed most 
succinctly, thought is a reasonable relation between a fact and a quality (a subject and a 
predicate). Thus, unlike a quality (which is non-relational), or a fact (which is a purely 
dyadic or binary relation), thought must have the form of a triadic relation (i.e., that 
which lawfully mediates, governs or brings together in a reasonable manner some fact 
and some quality). Hence, thought is mediation. 
 As a form of mediation, thought is an expression or instantiation of the form or 
mode of mediation as such, and the form or mode of mediation as such is that of a Sign. 
Hence all thought has the form of a representation or a Sign. (Peirce 1868a, p. 24) A sign 
possesses or is constituted by the following complex dynamical structure: 
 
I define a Sign as anything which on the one hand is so determined by an Object and on the other 
hand so determines an idea in a person’s mind, that this latter determination, which I term the 
Interpretant of the Sign, is thereby mediately determined by that Object. A Sign, therefore, has a 
triadic relation to its Object and to its Interpretant. (Peirce 1906-08, p. 482) 
 
And again 
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I use the word “Sign” in the widest sense for any medium for the communication or extension of a 
Form (or feature). Being medium, it is determined by something, called its Object, and determines 
something, called its Interpretant or Interpretand. But some distinctions have to be borne in mind 
in order rightly to understand what is meant by the Objects and by the Interpretant. In order that a 
Form may be extended or communicated, it is necessary that it should have been really embodied 
in a Subject independently of the communication; and it is necessary that there should be another 
Subject in which the same Form is embodied only in consequence of the communication. The 
Form (and the Form is the Object of the Sign), as it really determines the former Subject, is quite 
independent of the sign; yet we may and indeed must say that the object of a sign can be nothing 
but what that sign represents it to be. (Peirce 1906-08, p. 477) 
 
Signs mediate between Objects and Interpretants in three ways: 1) Iconically, in the 
conveyance of some qualitative aspect of an Object to some Interpretant (i.e., Depth or 
Signification), 2) Indexically, in the conveyance of some factual aspect of an Object to 
some Interpretant (i.e., Breadth or Denotation), and 3) Symbolically, in the conveyance of 
some reasonable or lawful aspect of an Object to some Interpretant (i.e. Information). 
While thought may include, and indeed must include if it is to convey any Information 
(Peirce 1894, p. 7) Iconic and Indexical aspects, thought in general has the form of a 
Symbol (though not all Symbols need be thoughts). 
 
In all reasoning, we have to use a mixture of likenesses, indices, and symbols. We cannot dispense 
with any of them. The complex whole may be called a symbol; for its symbolic, living character is 
the prevailing one. (Peirce 1894, p. 10) 
 
In the same way logic needs no distinction between the symbol and the thought; for every thought 
is a symbol and the laws of logic are true of all symbols. (Peirce 1865a, p. 166)  
 
A Symbol in this broad sense is a sign which mediates between Object and Interpretant 
by means of a conventional or habitual principle, rule, or governing condition. 
 
A Symbol is a Representamen whose Representative character consists precisely in its being a rule 
that will determine its Interpretant. All words, sentences, books, and other conventional signs are 
Symbols […] 
 A symbol is a law, or regularity of the indefinite future. Its Interpretant must be of the 
same description; and so must be also its complete immediate Object, or meaning. But a law 
necessarily governs, or “is embodied in” individuals, and prescribes some of their qualities. 
Consequently, a constituent of a Symbol may be an Index, and a constituent may be an Icon. A 
man walking with a child points up into the air and says, “There is a balloon.” The pointing arm is 
an essential part of the Symbol without which the latter would convey no information. But if the 
child asks, “What is a balloon?” and the man replies, “It is something like a great big soap 
bubble,” he makes the image a part of the Symbol. Thus, while the complete Object of a Symbol, 
that is to say, its meaning, is of the nature of a law, it must denote an individual, and must signify a 
character. A genuine Symbol is a Symbol that has a general meaning. (Peirce 1903g, pp. 274-275) 
 
In other words, a Symbol is a “sign whose Object is a general law or type” (Peirce 1903h, 
p. 293), but whose Object can only be conveyed by reference to an individual factuality 
whose qualities are prescribed by that law. Arguments are Symbols. (Peirce 1903g, p. 
286) 
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1.4 BRANCHES OF LOGIC 
 
Logic has three principal branches: 1) Speculative Grammar or the study of signs in 
general, 2) Critic which includes the classification of arguments and articulation of the 
validity conditions for and force of each argument kind, and 3) Methodeutic or the 
prescriptive study of method selection. Peirce’s account of the three branches of logic is a 
modern rendering of the medieval trivium (i.e., Grammar, Dialectic and Rhetoric). 
 Speculative grammar is semiotics, which Peirce calls the “physiological” aspect 
of logic. (Peirce 1903g, p. 272) It is also called “Originalian logic” “the doctrine of the 
general conditions of symbols and other signs having the significant character.” (Peirce 
CP 2.93) 
 Logical critic is concerned with “judging particularly what reasoning is good and 
what bad.” (Peirce 1903g, p. 272) It is also called “Obsistent logic, logic in the narrow 
sense” or “the theory of the general conditions of the reference of Symbols and other 
Signs to their professed Objects, that it, it is the theory of the conditions of truth.” (Peirce 
CP 2.93) 
 Methodeutic is “the principles of the production of valuable courses of research 
and exposition” (Peirce 1903g, p 272) It is also called “Transuasional logic” or “the 
doctrine of the general conditions by the reference of Symbols and other Signs to the 
Interpretants which they aim to determine.” Another name for methodeutic is Speculative 
Rhetoric (Peirce CP 2.93) Speculative Rhetoric is to be broadly understood as  
 
the method of discovering methods. This can only come from a theory of the method of discovery. 
In order to cover every possibility, this should be founded on a general doctrine of methods of 
attaining purposes, in general; and this, in turn, should spring from a still more general doctrine of 
the nature of teleological action, in general. (Peirce CP 2.108) 
 
This is “the highest and most living branch of logic.” (Peirce CP 2.333) It is concerned 
with the  
 
laws of the evolution of thought, which […] coincides with the study of the necessary conditions 
of the transmission of meaning by signs from mind to mind, and from one state of mind to another. 
(Peirce CP 1.444)  
 
If I understand Peirce correctly, then Speculative Rhetoric may be described broadly as 
that aspect of logic dedicated to prescribing the most effective means for discovering, 
articulating and communicating the truth (as the proper end of logic in general). 
 
1.5 THE ULTIMATE AIM OF LOGIC 
 
From this we can discern more clearly that Logic is a positive normative science whose 
ultimate aim is to advance thought towards the truth. As we shall see, this is equivalent to 
the aim at making the world more reasonable. The manner in which Logic advances 
thought towards the truth is not simply by advancing our knowledge directly (though this 
is an important aspect of Logic’s task), but by discovering/constructing a theory of how 
knowledge can best be advanced. 
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The ultimate aim of the logician is to make out a theory of how knowledge is advanced…. But this 
theory is not possible until the logician has first examined all the different elementary modes of 
getting at truth and especially all the different classes of arguments, and has studied their 
properties so far as these properties concern [the] power of the arguments as leading to the truth. 
This part of logic is called Critic. But before it is possible to enter upon this business in any 
rational way, the first thing that is necessary is to examine thoroughly all the ways in which 
thought can be expressed. For since thought has no being except in so far as it will be embodied, 
and since the embodiment of thought is a sign, the business of logical critic cannot be undertaken 
until the whole structure of signs, especially of general signs, has been thoroughly investigated. 
(Peirce 1903e, p. 256) 
 
While the ultimate aim of Logic is the selection of the methods that ought to be employed 
in the advancement of knowledge (where ‘ought to be’ is taken in a complex, triadic, 
normative sense), to best achieve that end depends, logically, upon a prior (and 
coincident) critical investigation of the different forms of argumentation (including their 
various strengths, limits, roles, etc.); this itself depends upon a prior (and coincident) 
semiotic investigation of the nature, role and function of signs (and of general signs in 
particular). Thus, Semiosis and Critic stand as necessary conditions for Logic’s ultimate 
aim of selecting the methods that ought to be employed in the advancement of knowledge 
towards the truth, for without the necessary work of Semiosis and Critic, Logical 
Methodeutic (or Speculative Rhetoric) could not fulfill is proper normative function 
(which is to best advance our knowledge to where it ought to be). As we shall see, this 
means that Logic, understood in its most complete and vital sense, is a power or capacity 
that is orientated or aimed at developing a theory for selecting methods that ought to be 
employed for the settlement of belief in the long run. 
 
2. ARGUMENT AND ARGUMENTATION 
 
It is only in his later works that Peirce explicitly differentiates Argument from 
Argumentation.  
 
An “Argument” is any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief. An 
“Argumentation” is an Argument proceeding upon definitely formulated premises. (Peirce 1908, 
p. 435) 
 
As already noted, Arguments are Symbols. As Symbols, Arguments communicate 
general laws, rules, habits, etc., that is, conditions that can serve as guiding or governing 
conditions of conduct rather than compulsive forces determining action. (Peirce 1903g, 
pp. 282-283) To function as an Argument, a process need only be such as to prompt or 
produce a definite belief, where belief itself functions to govern conduct generally (as a 
kind of general maxim as it were, not as a force that compels some action directly and 
specifically—I will have more to say about belief in section 3.0). 
 Logically speaking, while all Argumentations are Arguments, not all Arguments 
are Argumentations, that is, not all Arguments need have premises that can be given 
some definite formulation. (Peirce 1908, p. 441) Unlike Arguments, Argumentations 
must be deliberate and self-controlled to some degree: 
 
For this theory requires that in reasoning we should be conscious, not only of the conclusion, and 
of our deliberate approval of it, but also of its being the result of the premiss from which it does 
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result, and furthermore that the inference is one of a possible class of inferences which conform to 
one guiding principle. Now in fact we find a well-marked class of mental operations, clearly of a 
different nature from any others which do possess just these properties. They alone deserve to be 
called reasonings; and if the reasoner is conscious, even vaguely, of what his guiding principle is, 
his reasoning should be called a logical argumentation. (Peirce 1903e, p. 248) 
 
A process is generally self-controlled if it includes a conscious means of mitigating 
between some possible courses of action. 
 
The machinery of logical self-control works on the same plan as does moral self-control, in 
multiform detail. The greatest difference, perhaps, is that the latter serves to inhibit mad putting 
forth of energy, while the former most characteristically insures us against the quandary of 
Buridan’s ass. (Peirce 1905b, p. 347) 
 
Examples of Arguments that may not qualify as Argumentations include: some 
Retroductions (or Abductions), Explication (as the first stage of Deduction), and 
Classification (as the first stage of Induction). (Peirce 1908, p. 441-42)  
 While Argumentations have to be thought through in a deliberate, self-controlled 
manner, Arguments in general need not have any concrete mental instantiation, but need 
only extend to the level of thought in general. Argument in this sense implies any process 
or structure at the level of thought in general that would reasonably tend to produce a 
definite belief in some possible interpreter (as the locus of the Argument’s Interpretant, 
which is a necessary condition of any Symbol or Sign). Thus there could in principle be 
Arguments that are incomplete, idling, as it were, until such time as its Interpretant is 
produced (and thereby completing or fulfilling the Argument’s full semiotic structure or 
form).  
 
Moreover thought in general is a very different affair from thought. Thought in general prescinded 
not only from intuition—and so reduced to an ens imaginarium which is one of Kant’s four 
species of nothing—but also from all connection with the individual mind, is nothing but a fictions 
which expresses merely the possibilities of discourse. I propose to adhere to the essence of this 
definition but to regard it from such a point of view that it may not seem to have any more relation 
to psychology than it really has. 
 Suppose that in an undecipherable inscription of a long-extinct people an argument is 
written. Is that any less logically correct or fallacious because no one can read it and so no one can 
think it?  I believe the reader will agree that it is not. It seems to me to be in exactly the same 
condition as a flower in the desert. This is said to have colour, though colour is nothing but in the 
eye; and no one can see this flower. This colour is nothing actual—nothing physically possible—
but it is a fiction from which all the fictitious element has been eliminated by a device of language. 
Such fictions freed from fiction are common in mathematics, where they are exceedingly useful; 
and they can evidently do no harm, so long as they are understood. I may say that this page has a 
spot upon it, although it has none provided I add that the spot has no size or that it is in potential, 
or that the color is devoid of all intensity, or that it is neutralized by anti-redness. Such a fiction as 
this I propose to hold that meaning resides in words and other material representations whether 
these representations be understood or not and whether they be actually written or fashioned or 
not. (Peirce 1865b, pp. 306-307) 
 
Arguments need not entail Argumentations precisely because they are directed towards 
determining what any thinker ought to believe (and not to what any thinker actually 
happens to believe). While the quotation noted above comes from a very early work of 
Peirce’s, he makes a strikingly similar claim in one of his very late works where he 
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defines reasoning as “any change in thought that results in an appeal for some measure 
and kind of assent to the truth of a proposition called the “Conclusion” of the reasoning, 
as being rendered “Reasonable” by an already existing cogitation (usually complex) 
whose propositional formulation shall be termed the “Copulate Premiss” of the 
reasoning.” (Peirce 1911, p. 454) Continuing the discussion, Peirce outlines what he takes 
to be an important point that he had developed in more detail in his earlier work: 
 
There remains a third point that I shall not blamelessly leave wholly unexpressed, although I shall 
not undertake in this essay to bring readers to see its full importance. Namely, I have referred to 
reasoning as a process, or change, “of thought.” I have not said “of thinking,” since if, for 
example, there be a certain fossil fish, certain observations upon which, made by a skilled 
paleontologist, [and] taken in connection with chemical analyses of the bones and of the rock in 
which they were embedded, will one day furnish that paleontologist with the keystone of an 
argumentative arch upon which he will securely erect a solid proof of a conclusion of great 
importance, then, in my view, in the true logical sense, that thought has already all the reality it 
will ever have, although as yet the quarries have not been opened that will enable human minds to 
perform that reasoning. (Peirce 1911, p. 455)  
 
It would seem that it is the normative character of Arguments that frees them from having 
to be instantiated in any thinker here and now, for this allows them to refer to some 
possible thinker not yet present in any actual or fully determinate sense. 
 Understood in this general sense, it can make perfect sense to say that “the 
universe is an argument,” for it may be said to possess or be characterized by relations, 
structures, processes of thought in general that are capable of “reasonably tending to 
produce a definite belief” in some future interpreter (as the possible site of the 
Argument’s Interpretant). 
 
Now every symbol must have, organically attached to it, it Indices of Reactions and it Icons of 
Qualities; and such part as these reactions play in the Universe, that Universe being precisely and 
argument. In the little bit that you or I can make out of this huge demonstration, our perceptual 
judgments are the premises for us and these perceptual judgments have icons as their predicates, in 
which icons Qualities are immediately presented. But what is first for us is not first in nature. The 
premises of Nature’s own process are all the independent uncaused elements of fact that go to 
make up the variety of nature, which the necessitarian supposes to have been all in existence from 
the foundation of the world, but which the Tychist supposes are continually receiving new 
accretions. Those premises of nature, however, though they are not the perceptual facts that are 
premises to us, nevertheless must resemble them in being premises. We can only imagine what 
they are by comparing them with the premises for us. As premisses they must involve Qualities. 
 Now to their function in the economy of the Universe,--the Universe as an argument is 
necessarily a great work of art, a great poem,--for every fine argument is a poem and a symphony,-
-just as every true poem is a sound argument. But let us compare it rather with a painting,--with an 
impressionist seashore piece,--then every Quality in a premiss is one of the elementary colored 
particles of the painting; they are all meant to go together to make up the intended Quality that 
belongs to the whole as a whole. That total effect is beyond our ken; but we can appreciate in 
some measure the resultant Quality of parts of the whole,--which Qualities result from the 
combinations of the elementary Qualities that belong to the premisses. 
 But I shall endeavor to make this clear in the next lecture. (Peirce 1903c, pp. 193-94) 
 
Arguments in this general, logical sense are not peculiar to minds. Instead the mental 
embodiment or expression of an Argument or Argumentation is itself merely the broader 
argumentative structures and processes found throughout nature manifest or expressed in 
 9
PHILIP ROSE 
the mode of conscious thought or mind. There is no division or separation between mind 
and nature here. Mind is merely the structures or patterns found in nature raised to the 
level of conscious thought, and logic is merely those same argumentative structures 
brought under deliberate, self-controlled thought. This is consistent with the view already 
outlined that Arguments are Signs, and not all Signs need have a particular mental 
character (though they must be accessible to mind). Thus, Arguments as here understood 
are not merely things, structures or processes that we as individual thinkers employ. As 
Signs, Arguments are relations of a certain triadic (Symbolic), mediating character that 
are found throughout the world at large, regardless of their particular instantiation. It is 
certainly true that to count as an Argument, the triadic structure in question must be 
cognizable by some possible mind, but it need not be cognized by some actual mind here 
and now. What we call conscious thought or “mind is a sign developing according to the 
laws of inference” (Peirce 1868b, p. 53) and is constituted (at least in part) by the 
temporal transition through “beginning, middle, and end” (Peirce 1878a, p. 129) that is 
characteristic of an inference in general (Peirce 1866b, p. 494) Such inferential structures 
are not limited to minds, however, but can also be found instantiated in other dimensions 
of the natural world. For example, the tendency to develop or take on habits is not limited 
to mental phenomena: 
 
habit is by no means exclusively a mental fact. Empirically, we find that some plants take habits. 
The stream of water that wears a bed for itself is forming a habit. Every ditcher thinks of it. Turing 
to the rational side of the question, the excellent current definition of habit […] says not one word 
about the mind. Why should it, when habits in themselves are entirely unconscious, though 
feelings may be symptoms of them, and when consciousness alone,—i.e., feeling,—is the only 
distinctive attribute of mind? (Peirce 1907, p. 418) 
 
Similarly, operations found within nature, such as the automated movement of a frog’s 
legs from a stimulus, have the same structure of an inference. 
 
In deduction the mind is under the dominion of a habit or association by virtue of which a general 
idea suggests in each case a corresponding reaction. But a certain sensation is seen to involve that 
idea. Consequently, that sensation is followed by that reaction. That is the way the hind legs of a 
frog, separated from the rest of the body, reason, when you pinch them. It is the lowest form of 
psychical manifestation. (Peirce 1892b, p. 327) 
 
(I shall have more to say about the status of deduction as the “lowest form of psychical 
manifestation in section 4.0) 
 As an important addendum, it should be noted that no Argument functions in 
isolation. To be complete, an Argument must determine its Interpretant in a way that 
 
is complicated by the circumstance that the sign not only determines the interpretant to represent 
(or to take the form of) the object, but also determines the interpretant to represent the sign. Indeed 
in what we may, from one point of view, regard as the principle kind of signs, there is one distinct 
part appropriated to representing the object, and another to representing how this very sign itself 
represents that object. (Peirce 1906-08, pp. 477-478) 
 
Thus, a sign must convey to its Interpretant both the Form of the Object that is being 
conveyed, and the determinative role of the sign itself in the conveyance of that Object. 
Further, the sign must also convey the broader context within which the Object is to be 
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interpreted, as a necessary condition for the possibility of that interpretation (its broader 
Universe, as Peirce, puts it, or what would be akin to a “language game” using more 
Wittgensteinean parlance). 
 
There is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the utterer; and 
Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the interpreter; and the 
Communicational Interpretant, or say the Cominterpretant, which is a determination of that mind 
into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication 
should take place. This mind may be called the commens. It consists of all that is, and must be, 
well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the outset, in order that the sign in question 
should fulfill its function. (Peirce 1906-08, p. 478) 
 
The commens is a necessary condition for the possibility of any communication, serving 
as a holistic framework or means of orienting the interpreter so that the Intentional and 
Effectual aspects of the Interpretant may be properly conveyed (and so properly or 
truthfully interpreted). 
 
No object can be denoted unless it be put into relation to the objects of the commens. A man, 
tramping along a weary and solitary road, meets an individual of strange mien, who says, “There 
was a fire in Megara.” If this should happen in the Middle United States, there might very likely 
be some village in the neighborhood called Megara. Or it may refer to one of the ancient cities of 
Megara, or to some romance. And the time is wholly indefinite. In short, nothing at all is 
conveyed, until the person addressed asks, “Where?”—“O about a half a mile along there” 
pointing to whence he came. “And when?” “As I passed.” Now an item of information has been 
conveyed, because it has been stated relatively to a well-understood common experience. Thus the 
Form conveyed is always a determination of the dynamical object of the commind. By the way, the 
dynamical object does not mean something out of the mind. It means something forced upon the 
mind in perception, but including more than perception reveals. It is an object of actual 
Experience. (Peirce 1906-08, p. 478) 
 
3. REASON, INQUIRY AND THE SETTLEMENT OF BELIEF 
 
In a sense, Logic and reasoning are one and the same. Reasoning is the conscious 
instantiation or expression of Logic in general. 
 
Whatever opinion be entertained in regard to the scope of logic, it will be generally agreed that the 
heart of it lies in the classification and critic of arguments. Now it is peculiar to the nature of 
argument that no argument can exist without being referred to some special class of arguments. 
The act of inference consists in the thought that the inferred conclusion is true because in any 
analogous case an analogous conclusion would be true. Thus, logic is coeval with reasoning. 
Whoever reasons ipso facto virtually holds a logical doctrine, his logica utens. This classification 
is not a mere qualification of the argument. It essentially involves an approval of it,--a qualitative 
approval. Now such self-approval supposes self-control. Not that we regard our approval as itself 
a voluntary act, but that we hold the act of inference which we approve to be voluntary. That is, if 
we did not approve it, we should not infer. (Peirce 1903d, p. 200) 
 
In this broad, ‘naturalistic’4 framework, reason itself must be understood as the conscious 
expression of deeper non-conscious structures or forms. Viewed as a development from 
                                                            
4 My use of ‘scare quotes’ here is a bow to the fact that most naturalistic philosophers would have a much 
more minimalistic account of nature than the one I’m outlining here. Nevertheless, I stubbornly insist on 
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more base natural forms, the most proximate non-conscious or unconscious form or 
structure of which reason is a conscious development is instinct, “for Reason is a sort of 
instinct.” (Peirce 1913, p. 464, p. 472)  
 
When an animal responds to a stimulus in much the same was as almost any other individual of 
the same species or division of that species (such as sex, for example), and does not, so to speak, 
mechanically (as when a man’s kneepan is truck), but voluntarily , and when the response is of 
such a kind as generally to have a beneficial effect upon that same animal or its progeny, which 
effect, however, the animals that act so can hardly be supposed to have divined or, at any rate not 
to have ascertained by reasoning from any other facts within their knowledge, then we call the 
action “instinctive,” while the general habit of behavior, regarded as appertaining to the animal’s 
consciousness, we call “an instinct.” (Peirce 1913, p. 473) 
 
An instinct as here understood is a kind of habit, that is, a rule or general tendency, 
usually deeply inherited, that serves and has developed or evolved as a guide for action. 
(Peirce 1885, p. 226; Peirce 1913, pp. 464-465) Generally speaking (and as a function, in 
part, of evolution), instincts will be well adapted to achieving their purposes, successfully 
guiding or directing action in some general sense (or at the very least, better than chance 
alone would achieve). 
 As a sort of instinct, Reason is itself a set of deeply inherited dispositions or 
tendencies that serve to guide action which, in this specific sense, takes the form of 
conduct, that is, “action under an intention of self-control.” (Peirce 1909, p. 499) 
Understood as a kind of instinct, reason need not be limited to humans, and Peirce, 
explicitly admits that other animals seem to get around in the world, at least in part, by 
way of reason. 
 
I may notice, by the way, that when I was a child I was told by my teachers, or understood them 
so, that only human beings reason, while only the other animals have incomprehensible instincts; 
but I suppose that today only benighted persons any longer believe either of these two assertions. 
No animals reason so much as men or about such intricate subjects; but to say that an intelligent 
dog, or horse, or parrot, or magpie, or canary bird does not reason at all, or only in such ways as 
humans have taught him, can have no definite meaning. On the other hand, to say that man has no 
incomprehensible instincts would be to talk without reflection and from surprisingly slight or else 
shockingly untilled experience. (Peirce 1913, p. 470) 
 
 As a condition for self-controlled or deliberate conduct, the proper function of 
reason is tied directly to belief, for belief is a kind of habit or disposition that serves to 
guide or direct conduct generally. (Peirce 1907, pp. 432-433; Peirce 1908, p. 440) A 
habit, broadly speaking, is “the generalization of effort” (Peirce 1907, p. 432) 
 
Habits differ from dispositions in having been acquired as consequence of the principle, virtually 
well known even to those whose powers of reflection are insufficient to its formulation, that 
multiply reiterated behavior of the same kind, under similar combinations of percepts and fancies, 
produces a tendency,—the habit,—actually to behave in a similar way under similar circumstances 
in the future. (Peirce 1907, p. 413) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
my less conventional usage because the overly minimalistic assumptions that most philosophers have of 
nature is one of the very things I am challenging in this paper.  
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In one sense then reason is a self-controlled process or power of forming or selecting 
effective habits, that is, habits that are maximally effective in achieving their proper 
purposes. 
 
The term “reasoning” ought to be confined to such fixation of one belief by another as is 
reasonable, deliberate, self-controlled. A reasoning must be conscious; and this consciousness is 
not mere “immediate consciousness,” which (as I argued in 1868, Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy) is simple Feeling viewed from another side, but is in its ultimate nature (meaning in 
that characteristic element of it that is not reducible to anything simpler), a sense of taking a habit, 
or disposition to respond to a given kind of stimulus in a given kind of way. (Peirce 1905b, p. 347) 
 
Located within the larger context of this discussion, the primary role of reasoning will be 
the formation of increasingly reliable habits to serve as reliable guides or directives of 
future conduct. In other words, the primary role of reason will be the formation of true (or 
truer) beliefs. 
 
When it happens that a new belief comes to one as consciously generated from a previous belief,--
an event which can only occur in consequences of some third belief (stored away in some dark 
closet of the mind, as a habit of thought) being in a suitable relation to that second one,—I call the 
event an inference, or a reasoning. And your Honor, the Reader, will please observe that any 
decided leaning toward a belief is or involves a full belief; namely, the full belief that the 
substance of the belief to which one leans is probable, or promising, or has some other title to 
intellectual honor. (Peirce 1913, p. 463) 
 
 The habits of reasoning, generally understood, are the three classes or kinds of 
inferences that Peirce identifies as Abduction, Deduction, and Induction (including the 
formal Leading Principles that serve as the guides for each of those forms of reasoning). 
The soundness of these logical forms rests upon the factual question of whether they have 
a greater tendency to generate truths than chance alone would allow.  
 
the only fact which the soundness of all reasoning and the truth of all human thought really 
depends [on] is that man’s conjectures are somewhat better than purely random propositions…. 
the question of what is good reasoning and what bad is not a question of whether the mind 
approves it or not, but is a question of fact. A method that tends to carry us toward the truth more 
speedily than we could otherwise progress is good; a method that has a tendency to carry us away 
from the truth is utterly bad, whether we naturally approve it or not. (Peirce 1903e, p. 252) 
 
Logically speaking, a habit will have the greatest chance of success in guiding action if it 
is true, that is, if its law, tendency or rule conforms to reality. Hence the proper end of 
reason, that which will allow it to serve as the most reliable guide to action in its maximal 
sense, must be truth or the maximal conformity of the beliefs which reason produces with 
reality in general in the long run. In a sense, the entire discussion of Peirce’s “The 
Fixation of Belief” is a demonstration (or perhaps more accurately, a monstration, a 
bringing to critical attention) of that logical point. For to say that reason’s proper function 
is to serve as a reliable guide for conduct means that the point of view, the conclusions 
that reason asserts and defends will not be upset by any possible conflicting, constraining 
conditions, central of which are what Peirce includes under the general category of 
experience. 
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An “Experience” is a brutally produced conscious effect that contributes to a habit, self-controlled, 
yet so satisfying, on deliberation, as to be destructible by no positive exercise of internal vigor. 
(Peirce 1908, p. 435) 
 
As Peirce, argues, while the methods of tenacity and authority (where the a priori method 
is seen as the authority of one’s present rational predilections) may successfully buffer 
the effects of unsettling, conflicting constraints in the short term (logically speaking), 
only a method that is able to avoid unsettlement from all possible sources will serve as a 
successful guide to action in the long run. And the one method that best achieves that end 
is the one that tries to bring reason and belief into perfect conformity with reality, as that 
end to which all rational inquiry must consent in the long run. Hence Peirce’s oft repeated 
claim (with numerous variations) that 
 
an inference is “logical,” if, and only if, it is governed by a habit that would in the long run lead to 
the truth. (Peirce 1906-08, p. 480)  
 
Expressed in pragmatic terms, an inference is logical only if it tends generally or in the 
long run to effect conduct that will attain its purposes, again in the long run. Inferences 
that tend toward the truth, that is, that conform to reality will have the best chance of 
achieving these ends in the long run. 
 Hence the end or proper function of reason is attainment of true belief, that is, the 
bringing of belief into conformity with reality in the long run, a kind of conformity which 
will inevitably result in universal consensus, or what Peirce variously calls the final 
opinion. 
 
4. EVOLUTION AND GROWTH: CONSENSUS AS A REGULATIVE IDEAL 
 
Reasoning, as here outlined, is a vital power or capacity whose function is the 
progressive modification of belief for the increasingly effective conduct of life.  
 
Now good reasoning is reasoning which attains its purpose. Its purpose is to supply a guide for 
conduct,—and thinking, being an active operation, is a species of conduct,—in case no percept 
from which a judgment could have been directly formed, is at hand. Its object is to say what the 
reasoned either will think when that percept occurs, or what he would think if it did occur. The 
psychological process of reasoning is wholly aside from the purpose of logic. (Peirce 1906, pp. 
386-387) 
 
As Peirce argues in “The Fixation of Belief,” the aim at increasingly effective conduct is 
equivalent, logically (in his broad sense of the term), to an aim at beliefs that are true in 
the long run. Beliefs that have been settled by other means (e.g., tenacity, cultural 
authority, a priori authority, etc.) will inevitably. i.e., logically, be unsettled by 
experience in the long run. Only beliefs that are true, that is, which conform to reality 
(again in the broad, logical sense of that term), will result in maximally effective conduct. 
Therefore, the most logical course of action is to aim at developing beliefs that will 
remain true under all real circumstances, and thereby remain maximally effective for all 
future conduct. Expressed in different terms, the ultimate aim of reasoning and 
argumentation ought to be a maximal integrity of belief. Achieving maximal integrity of 
 14
THE UNIVERSE AS AN ARGUMENT 
belief is a normative demand placed on us as logical beings, that is, beings who are “in 
the main logical animals.” (Peirce 1877, p. 112) 
 
But above all, let it be considered that what is more wholesome than any particular belief is 
integrity of belief, and that to avoid looking into the support of any belief from a fear that it may 
turn out rotten is quite as immoral as it is disadvantageous. The person who confesses that there is 
such a thing as truth, which is distinguished from falsehood simply in this, that if acted upon it will 
carry us to the point at which we aim and not astray, and then, though convinced of this, dares not 
know the truth and seeks to avoid it, is in a sorry state of mind indeed. (Peirce 1877, p. 123) 
 
Logically speaking, maximal integrity of belief is equivalent to rational consensus, for 
without such rational consensus, beliefs cannot be adequately settled. Without rational 
consensus the integrity of one’s beliefs will inevitably remain threatened by the 
possibility of a rational disensus (i.e., the real, logical possibility that one’s beliefs are 
not true). Integrity of belief thereby entails the elimination of all rational disensus. In 
other words, true integrity of belief must be at once both individual and communal. This 
amounts to saying that my own finite interests must be one with (e.g., be rationally 
coherent with) the interests of the community in the broadest sense of that term. 
 
But what, without death, would happen to every man, with death must happen to some man. At the 
same time, death makes the number of our risks, of our interests, finite, and so makes their mean 
result uncertain. The very idea of probability and of reasoning rests on the assumption that this 
number is indefinitely great. We are thus landed in the same difficulty as before, and I can see but 
one solution of it. It seems to me that we are driven to this, that logicality inexorably requires that 
our own interest shall not be limited. They must not stop at our own fate, but must embrace the 
whole community. This community, again, must not be limited, but must extend to all races or 
beings with whom we can come into immediate or mediate intellectual relation. It must reach, 
however vaguely, beyond this geological epoch, beyond all bounds. He who would not sacrifice 
his own soul to save the whole world, is, as it seems to me, illogical in all his inferences, 
collectively. Logic is rooted in the social principle. (Peirce 1878b, p. 149) 
 
It is noteworthy here that a necessary condition of logicality in general is Hope. Without 
the hope of constructing a rational consensus or communal belief about what ought to be, 
argumentation and reasoning are rendered vain and futile. Hope thus stands as a 
necessary condition for the possibility of logic and argumentation as such. Such hope is 
itself rendered more hopeful by the fact that reasoning and argumentation are not 
confined to a statically bound framework of fixed limits and deductive compromise 
(where consensus entails giving up as much as you get), but are situated instead within a 
vital, evolutionary framework. Thus the real aim of reasoning and argumentation is not 
consensus in any deductive sense (soon to be explained), but evolution or growth. But the 
growth we are speaking of here is not some sheer or mere growth as an end in-itself 
(which would not preclude maladaptive, pathogenic or cancerous growths), but 
reasonable growth, that is the growth of reasonableness per se. 
 To understand what is meant by growth here, we must first notice that while all 
inquiry (and argumentation is a form of inquiry) is logically aimed at the settlement or 
satisfaction of belief, this logical or, as I would call it, alethic orientation does not (and 
indeed cannot) require or entail the actual settlement of belief in any final or absolute 
sense. The end of inquiry or ultimate settlement of belief, as here employed, stands 
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logically as a limit concept or ideal limit at which inquiry is aimed (or toward which it is 
oriented), but which can never be actually achieved. 
 
if Truth consists in satisfaction, it cannot be any actual satisfaction, but must be the satisfaction 
that would ultimately be found if the inquiry were pushed to its ultimate and indefeasible issue. 
(Peirce 1908, p. 450) 
Every action has a motive; but an ideal only belongs to a line of conduct which is deliberate. To 
say that conduct is deliberate implies that each action, or each important action, is reviewed by the 
actor and that his judgment is passed upon it, as to whether he wishes his future conduct to be like 
that or not. (Peirce 1906, p. 377) 
 
Like any such limit concept, the best that we can actually hope to achieve in any finite, 
actual, deterministic sense is to approach the limit or ideal at which we are aimed 
asymptotically (i.e., approaching, but never reaching). Thus, while logic or rational 
thought as such may be oriented towards the truth in some ideal sense, the real, actual 
measure of logical or rational advance is not consensus as such (in any final sense of that 
term), but growth towards a rational consensus, that is, a continuous increase in the 
integrity of belief at both the individual and the communal level. 
 
Accordingly, the pragmaticist does not make the summum bonum to consist in action, but makes it 
to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those 
generals which were just now said to be destined, which is that we strive to express in calling them 
reasonable. (Peirce 1905a, p. 343) 
 
As an aspect of expression of thought in general, reasoning and Argumentation function 
as aids or guides to future conduct. As a Symbolic semiotic guide to future conduct, 
reasoning (or Argumentation) thus functions as a governor of conduct (rather than a strict 
compulsive force) whose success is to be measured by the growth of reasonableness. 
 
The very being of the General, of Reason, consists in its governing individual events. So, then, the 
essence of Reason is such that its being can never have been completely perfected. It must always 
be in a state of incipiency, of growth […] So, then, the development of Reason requires as a part 
of it the occurrence of more individual events than ever can occur. It requires, too, all the coloring 
of all qualities of feeling, including pleasure in its proper place among the rest. This development 
of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment, that is, in manifestation. (Peirce 1903e, p. 
255) 
 
The aim at making the world more reasonable is, for Peirce, the only thing that seems to 
be fully and completely admirable in-itself, and so deserving of the status of being a truly 
ultimate aim. 
 
The one thing whose admirableness is not due to an ulterior Reason is Reason itself comprehended 
in all its fullness, so far as we can comprehend it. Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will 
be to execute our little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward rendering 
the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is “up to us” to do so. In logic, it will be 
observed that knowledge is reasonableness; and the ideal of reasoning will be to follow such 
methods as must develop knowledge most speedily. (Peirce 1903e, p. 255) 
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In the full, aesthetically, ethically and alethically vital sense implied here, “speedily” 
means that one ought to advance the pursuit and acquisition of reasonableness in a way 
that preserves and promotes what is most admirable, good, and true. 
 Expressed in Peirce’s earliest and most minimalistic logical sense (which is all I 
have room for here), and beginning with the logical notions of Breadth and Depth (where 
Breadth is roughly equivalent to denotation, extension, sphere, etc. and Depth is roughly 
equivalent to connotation, intention, signification, etc.), then growth is the synthesis of 
Breadth and Depth in what Peirce calls a state of Information. For Peirce, a fixed or 
complete deductive system is a closed system where equilibrium entails that Breadth and 
Depth stand in an inverse relation to one another. In such a closed system, an increase in 
Depth must be accompanied by a corresponding decrease in Breadth, and vice versa. 
There is no possibility of growth in such a closed, deductive system. In what he calls a 
state of Information, on the other hand (which in his later works is expanded into his 
account of dynamic evolutionary development), Breadth and Depth need not stand in 
inverse proportion to one another, but can increase “conversely.” This converse increase 
in Breadth and Depth in a state of Information is a logical form of growth. Thus we see 
that growth in this sense is only possible in an open system, that is, a system which 
admits the possibility of genuine novelty. Deduction, taken by itself, is an insufficient 
condition for the possibility of knowledge in any genuine, ampliative sense. For 
deduction is not ampliative in any genuine sense (advancing us toward a conclusion not 
already present in the premise), but is primarily explicative or demonstrative and so 
merely explicates what we know. (Peirce 1866a), p. 463) Genuine knowledge (i.e., 
learning) requires that we advance to conclusions that are not already contained in the 
premises. Hence, genuine knowledge cannot be obtained within a purely deductive, that 
is, a fixed framework of static equilibrium. Thus, what Peirce is here calling Information 
is a necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge as such. We see Peirce first 
developing this idea as early as 1866.  
 
Now deduction rests as we have seen upon the inverse proportionality of the extension and 
comprehension of every term; and this principle makes it impossible apparently to proceed in the 
direction of assent to universals. But a little reflection will show that when our knowledge receives 
an addition this principle does not hold. (Peirce 1866a, p. 463) 
 
Thus, the rule that the greater the extension of a term the less its comprehension and vice versa, 
holds good only so long as our knowledge is not added to; but as soon as our knowledge is 
increased, either the comprehension or extension of that term which the new information concerns 
is increased without a corresponding decrease of the other quantity. The reason why this takes 
place is worthy of notice. Every addition to the information which is incased in a term, results in 
making some term equivalent to that term [...] Thus, every addition to our information about a 
term, is an addition to the number of equivalents which that term has. Now, in whatever way a 
term gets to have a new equivalent, whether by an increase in our knowledge, or by a change in 
the things it denotes, this always results in an increase either of extension or comprehension 
without a corresponding decrease in the other quantity. (Peirce 1866a, pp. 463-464) 
 
Thus every increase in the number of equivalents of any term increases either its extension or 
comprehension and conversely. (Peirce 1866a, p. 464) 
 
What we see in this somewhat formal discussion of Breadth, Depth and Information is an 
earlier version of Peirce’s later, more explicitly evolutionary account of growth. The 
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seeds or traces of the same vitalistic, evolutionary language is already present here, but in 
a less broadly developed form.  
 
Indeed, the process of getting an equivalent for a term, is an identification of two terms previously 
diverse. It is, in fact, the process of nutrition of terms by which they get all their life and vigor and 
by which they put forth an energy almost creativeBsince it has the effect of reducing the chaos of 
ignorance to the cosmos of science. Each of these equivalents is the explication of what there is 
wrapt up in the primaryBthey are the surrogates, the interpreters of the original term. I call then the 
interpretants of the term. And the quantity of these interpretants, I term the information or 
implication of the term. (Peirce 1866a, pp. 464-465) 
 
So important was this insight to Peirce that at one point in these earlier works he declares 
it to the fundamental secret of logic. 
 
I here announce the great and fundamental secret of the logic of science. There is no term, 
properly so called, which is entirely destitute of information, of equivalent terms. The moment an 
expression acquires sufficient comprehension to determine its extension, it already has more than 
enough to do so. (Peirce 1866a, p. 465) 
 
We see this same vitalistic theme repeated in 1873. 
 
If two terms a and b differ so that we may write a is b, but not b is a, as for example, we may say 
that any man is an animal but not that every animal is a man, then the term of which the other may 
be predicated is said to have less breadth than the latter; meaning by that that there are fewer terms 
of which it can be predicated while that the other term is said to have less depth, meaning by that 
that there are fewer terms which can not be predicated of it. It is obvious, and requires no proof 
that of the two terms the one which has the greater breadth has the less depth and vice versa. 
(Peirce 1873, p. 88) 
 
it is useful to consider the known breadth and depth of a term in different states of our knowledge. 
In any one state of our knowledge every term is known to be predicable of certain others, and have 
certain others predicable of it. And of the two terms the one which has all those things predicable 
of it which are predicable of the other and more beside, is itself predicable of only a part of these 
terms of which the other is predicable, and vice versa. The effect of an addition to our knowledge 
is to make one term predicable of another which was not so before to our knowledge. And it thus 
at once increases the known depth of the subject term, and the known breadth of the predicate 
term, without any decrease of either of these qualities so that in the increase of knowledge the 
known breadth and depth of terms are constantly increasing and the sum of the breadths and 
depths on either product, if you please, will measure the extent to which investigation has been 
pushed. (Peirce 1893, p. 89) 
 
What is expressed epistemically here as “different states of our knowledge” is greatly 
expanded in Peirce’s later works to an ontological account of ‘different states of reality.’ 
For as he studies this more carefully and rigorously Peirce comes to realize that what is 
true epistemically is also true of reality in general, namely, that reality itself is an open 
rather than a closed system. Even the very laws that we discover to be operative in nature 
in general are not themselves fixed, a-historical principles or conditions, but regularities 
of nature that have themselves evolved or come into being, and continue to evolve in 
response to the novel additions or “accretions” to reality as a whole. 
 Given this radical, evolutionary account of the real as an open system, the epitome 
or model of reason cannot be deduction (as has been traditionally maintained), but the 
more vital argument forms of abduction and induction. For deduction stands as the ideal 
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only within a completed, closed system. But in an open system such as ours, such as 
really exists, then the most vital expressions of reason will be those that play the strongest 
role in advancing our knowledge beyond what we already know, beyond what is already 
contained in the premises. What appear as weaknesses to abduction and induction from 
the looking glass world of an ideal, closed, deductive system are in the real, the actual 
world their greatest strengths, for these more vital, more life-enhancing argument forms 
are not bound to or limited by the conditions of their premises, but move us beyond those 
conditions, beyond those limits. Such movement, such growth is essential to the vital 
function of reason not simply because it allows our knowledge to grow in some isolated 
sense, but also because nature and existence itself is continuously evolving and growing 
in novel ways. If mind is to truly conform to the real, then it must evolve and grow as the 
real evolves and grows, keeping pace with its changes. A static, purely deductive 
approach to inquiry cannot attain this end, at least not by itself. Deduction has its place, 
of course, as a necessary stage in the process of inquiry and the general aim at consensus, 
but it has a much lesser role than the more vital argument forms of abduction and 
induction. In an open, evolutionary system such as this, those forms of argument that 
have been traditionally vilified for being unable to measure up to the strict standards of 
deduction are suddenly cast in a new, more vital light. In a real sense, Peirce’s system 
turns traditional logic on its head. From the point of view of logic, of reason as such, it is 
the certain, the absolute, that has to be looked upon with caution and suspicion, and those 
who fail to present their rationally held beliefs in a provisional, testable manner is to be 
rightly judged as less reasonable than they ought to be. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
Under this dynamic, evolutionary, ‘naturalistic’ account of argumentation (which Peirce 
broadly calls Logic), principles of argumentation (such as logical principles, or leading 
principles) and argument forms are not universally fixed forms that are valid across all 
possible times. Like laws of nature, such principles and forms are formalized conditions 
that have evolved or come into being over the course of time and history. As Peirce goes 
to great pains to argue, reason cannot authorize its own legitimacy or validity by 
appealing to a priori or transcendental principles (as a-historical, non-temporal conditions 
or grounds), for these principles are themselves part of the form and function of reason as 
a historically situated mode of world-orientation. The validity of any such principles is 
not something that can be demonstrated once and for all, but must always be up for 
question. As such, the validity and legitimacy of reason depends upon whether or not its 
use results in a greater tendency towards the truth than might be expected by randomness 
or chance. This itself can never be absolutely, deductively demonstrated, of course, which 
entails that if reason, as the search for truth (logically understood) is to be secure, then it 
must stand in relation to some non-reason, that is, something that is independent of any 
historically situated reasoner. That which is independent of reason or thought 
(contingently understood) is reality. Hence the ultimate guide or ground for determining 
the legitimacy and authority of reason cannot by any principle as such (as traditional 
metaphysics has held), but a secure and reliable method of securing the reliability, 
validity and truthfulness of the principles and forms of reason in general. This is why 
Peirce places so much emphasis on method, and upon logic as a methodological 
 19
PHILIP ROSE 
orientation normatively aimed at method selection (for the settlement of belief). In fact, 
many of Peirce’s better known early writings are directed precisely towards highlighting 
the limitations of our faculties and epistemic “incapacities” with the aim of redirecting 
attention towards the importance and role of method in making our ideas clear and in 
fixing our belief. Viewed from this point of view, these early works are in essence a 
defense of Logic as the normative method for selecting methods (thereby ensuring that 
inquiry remains truthfully oriented in the most effective manner possible). As a normative 
method of method selection, the leading or logical principles that logic itself employs in 
directing its selections must themselves be taken as provisional, revisable and subject to 
continual testing, experimentation and improvement. Also, since Logic, as a normative 
science, must rest its own principles upon those of Ethics and Aesthetics (as its 
developmental base), then Logic (or Argumentation Theory) must include the study of 
the norms and principles underlying these other normative sciences in order to more fully 
understand and direct its own activities in an increasingly self-controlled manner. 
 Within the Peircean-styled, evolutionary framework that we are outlining here, 
reason and argumentation in general (which is what we are trying to understand here) can 
only be properly understood when viewed from within their real, lived context. As Peirce 
puts it, to truly understand what “reasoning” means “we have to shape our thoughts to the 
general facts of human life.” (Peirce 1911, p. 453) From the general facts of human life 
we discern that no single argument form (and that includes deduction), stands on its own 
as the perfect or ideal model of reason in general. Instead, reason in general is the entire 
package of argument forms taken together. Reasoning is a mode of orientation, a way of 
mapping the world. It seeks both to uncover the general conditions that mediate or govern 
(or ought to mediate and govern) actual occurrences in the world, and to construct or 
advance the effectiveness of those conditions that ought to mediate future actual 
occurrences. This is part of its ultimate aim of making the world more reasonable. In 
seeking these mediating conditions, reason serves to bring mind into conformity with the 
general, governing conditions that both are and ought to be operative in the world, 
conditions that are themselves continually evolving.  
 Viewed in this broader, naturalized light, the various forms of argument (e.g., 
abduction, deduction and induction) should not be read as standing independent of one 
another as if they could be sufficiently analyzed and understood in and of themselves. 
Instead, these argument forms each stand as necessary phases or stages in the full, vital 
work of reason as such. For it is only when taken together, as necessary stages in the vital 
work of reason in general, that the larger role and function of each can be properly 
evaluated and understood. Viewed independently in and of themselves (as seems too 
often to be the case), each form of reasoning seems replete with problems. Abduction, for 
example, is often said to be problematic because it is ignorance preserving, induction is 
unable to demonstrate its own validity (partly, I believe, because it is being measured 
against deductive criteria), and deduction has long been accused of impotence in actually 
advancing our knowledge (being primarily explicative and demonstrative in character). 
These perceived deficiencies are a product, however (at least in part), of failing to 
understand the proper role of each form in the broader activity of reason (and logic or 
argumentation) as such. When abstracted from “the general facts of human life,” for 
example, it is not clear whether deduction per se could even count as a form of reasoning 
as such. For if, as Peirce himself notes, “that cannot properly be called reasoning which 
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does not carry us from the known to the unknown,” (W 3, p. 14) then it is questionable 
whether deduction, which functions more like a lifeless, mechanistic or compulsive 
derivation, could count as a genuine form of reasoning per se (hence Peirce’s earlier 
description of the deductive form as the “lowest form of psychical manifestation”). When 
viewed in its proper explicative and demonstrative role, however, (as a necessary state in 
the testing of an abductive hypothesis), deduction clearly emerges as a vital condition in 
the broader life of reason in general. Reasoning and argumentation in their fullest, most 
vital sense then, ought not to be limited to any single argument form, but ought to 
encompass all the various stages and argument forms needed to accomplish their ultimate 
and necessarily vital ends. 
 At the level of logic or argumentation in general (as here outlined), the ultimate 
and vital end or aim of reason is to move particular minds toward a general consensus as 
to what ought to be affirmed and assented to at the level of thought (e.g., consensus about 
what is better or worse, life-enhancing or life destructive, true or false). Nevertheless, 
while the ultimate aim of reason (as a regulative ideal towards which we, as logically 
hopeful beings are oriented) may be consensus, the real measure and vital function of 
logic or argumentation ought to be the enabling and enhancement of the general growth 
of reasonableness. The growth of reasonableness in its most general sense involves 
bringing compulsive forces, facts or events under the general guidance or governance of 
laws or rules (hence the growth or order in the universe counts as a growth in 
reasonableness in a purely logical sense). In the particular context of self-controlled 
conduct (whether aesthetically, ethically or logically oriented), the growth of 
reasonableness means bringing compulsive occurrences, relations or actions under the 
general guidance or governance of what ought to be (aesthetically, ethically or logically). 
The reference to reasonableness here must be understood at a number of levels.  
 Firstly and perhaps most simply, making the world more reasonable would 
involve the progression or growth of reason as such, that is, the possibility of 
improvement in the validity and quality of reasoning per se. The validity and proper 
application of particular forms of reasoning should be improved and better established in 
the long run, resulting in general improvements in the quality of reasoning and 
argumentation at both an individual and at a communal (e.g., institutional) level. Such 
improvements are possible first because they are but an instance or expression of the 
evolutionary character of existence in general, and secondly because reason or 
argumentation contains within itself a necessary, self-critical component (i.e., be self-
controlled and deliberate). As Peirce notes: 
 
“What causes men to reason right?” That question I did substantially answer in my first lecture. 
Namely, to begin with, when a boy or girl first begins to criticize his inferences, and until he does 
that he does not reason, he finds that he has already strong prejudices in favor of certain ways of 
arguing. Those prejudices, whether they be inherited or acquired, were first formed under the 
influence of the environing world, so that it is not surprising that they are largely right or nearly 
right. He, thus, has a basis to go upon. But if he has the habit of calling himself to account for his 
reasonings, as all of us do more or less, he will gradually come to reason much better; and this 
comes about through his criticism, in the light of experience, of all the factors that have entered 
into reasonings that were performed shortly before the criticism. Occasionally, he goes back to the 
criticism of habits of reasoning which have governed him for many years. (Peirce 1903e, p. 534 
Note 6) 
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Given this, then we should expect to find an overall improvement in reasoning and 
argumentation throughout the long history of homo sapiens, particularly in the 
methodeutic selection of methods of reasoning that are better attuned to their purposes 
and aims. Some may dismiss this idea of a progressive development of reason as a 
suspiciously ‘modern,’ colonialist notion, but to deny that there are any genuine, life-
enabling measures of good and bad reasoning, and that the application and adaptation of 
these norms to their intended ends has not seen general improvement seems beyond the 
pale. It may be the case, of course, that progress in such things as argumentative 
methodeutic do not permit of any absolute or perfect demonstration (in a narrow, 
deductive sense), but the call for such absolute demonstrations is itself unrealistic, 
unreasonable, and despairing, “the lowest form of psychical manifestation.” 
 Making the world more reasonable also applies to other areas as well. It applies 
scientifically, for example, in Peirce’s dictum that one should never block the road to 
inquiry by declaring some fact or condition to be unintelligible. Such a declaration is 
absolutely detrimental to inquiry, marking its death and the death of reason (and the aim 
at reasonableness) as such. For to declare something unintelligible is to abandon all 
reason, all hope, and to give in to despair. Thus, making the world more reasonable 
means an unceasing commitment to inquiry in its broadest and richest sense.  
 Extending this point, the call to make reasonable should also be applied to other 
domains as well. It should also apply, for example, to personal and social relations as a 
critical condition for resolving regressive conflicts and for promoting consensus in some 
provisional sense. Just as one should never block the path to inquiry in a narrow sense, so 
too one should not block the path to inquiry or argumentation in a more general sense by 
declaring some conflict or condition (whether personal, political, environmental, etc.) to 
be absolutely irresolvable. For to declare some conflict or tension to be rationally 
irresolvable is, in effect, to give up on the possibility of its resolution (thereby giving in, 
once again to despair). This applies not just at the level of individual persons, but at 
social, institutional and other levels of analysis as well. Of course, while it may be 
necessary at times to postpone efforts at arriving at a reasonable resolution to some 
conflict, it would be illogical and unreasonable to abandon such efforts altogether. 
 Making the world more reasonable would also include making the institutions and 
other culturally constructed conditions conform to what they ought to be. Put very 
broadly, institutions or other culturally constructed governing condition ought to be what 
they ought to do. Such governing conditions ought to function in a way that enables the 
things they govern (whether they be persons, non-human animals, environments, etc.) to 
be what they ought to be, that is, to be whatever is best for them (locally and generally). 
Determining what ought to be must itself be a continuous inquiry that develops and 
evolves in a way that remains attuned to the continuously evolving nature of reality, a 
process of evolutionary advance must remain essentially incomplete. Such 
incompleteness, however, does not mean that there is no possibility and no measure of 
progressive advance. To affirm this is itself part of what it means to be a rational being, 
and hence is essential to the very aim at reasonableness per se. 
 Understood in this broad, naturalistic sense (and using the long standing metaphor 
of orientation), what Peirce calls logic (and reason) and the corresponding aim at 
reasonableness stands as a kind of compass by which we as humans are oriented to our 
world. Logic or reason, in this sense, is literally a mode of orientation, a particular way of 
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negotiating and navigating the sea of qualities, facts and relations within which we find 
ourselves. As a compass or mode of orientation, reason (and the forms of argumentation 
it employs) in its very essence is generally directed or oriented towards what we call the 
truth. Hence, logic or reason functions as what I would call an alethic compass. It is but 
one such compass, and it need not (and indeed should not) be restricted to the 
peculiarities of our human mode of existence (though certain features of that compass 
may indeed be peculiarly human, e.g., the anthropology or psychology or certain 
argumentative effects). Thus, when Peirce says that we are “in the main logical animals,” 
(Peirce 1977, p. 112) this does not mean that we always act according to reason, nor that 
we always reason well (in a strict, performance by performance sense of that term). 
Expressed in terms of the distinctions here noted, it means that as rational beings we have 
an alethic orientation, that is, that our rational attitude and the methods we employ as 
rational beings (as a way of navigating or negotiating the world) are generally oriented 
towards the truth. 
 In keeping with Peirce’s triadic framework, logic would seem to be one of three 
main ways in which we as humans are generally oriented in the world, the other two 
being our aesthetic and our ethical orientation. Following this, we may say that there are 
three distinct (but related) compasses that we as humans use in orienting ourselves in the 
world: A) an aesthetic compass, B) an ethical compass, and C) an alethic compass. Our 
aesthetic compass is generally oriented towards the admirable (i.e., what stands as an end 
in-itself); our ethical compass is generally oriented towards the ideal (as the end proper to 
conduct in general); and our alethic compass is generally oriented towards the true (as the 
end proper to the conduct of thought). Each of these modes of orientation has a 
corresponding normative science, a theory of what “ought to be” for each. Thus, 
Aesthetics is aimed at “right being,” Ethics is aimed at “right effort,” and Logic is aimed 
at “right reason” (i.e., “that which shall be conducive to our ultimate aims”; Peirce 1903a, 
p. 144; Peirce 1903e, p. 252) Each mode of orientation also has a corresponding “faculty” 
or power associated with it: 1) the observational powers of the “faculty of the artist,” 2) 
the attentive power of “resolute discrimination,” and 3) the “generalizing power of the 
mathematician.” (Peirce 1903b, pp. 147-148) These correspond, once again, to the three 
moments or ‘dimensions’ of mind, namely, Sensation, Attention, and Thought. (Peirce 
1913, p. 471) The position I’m outlining here is, of course, another play upon the 
traditional triad of the Beautiful, the Good and the True. Unlike some thinkers, however, 
I don’t think we need be particularly embarrassed about that. In fact, I think such an 
affinity stands as a point in its favor.  
 Part of our alethic orientation is our general tendency to achieve the settlement of 
belief. In fact, in one respect the settlement of belief is itself an expression of our alethic 
orientation (its constitutive manifestation or lived expression as it were). For belief, 
broadly understood, is the development of general tendencies or habits aimed at 
successfully realizing or making actual what ought to be. But this end is not something 
that can ever be factually achieved. It is instead more like a regulative ideal, an absolute 
limit to which inquiry stands, and can only stand, in an asymptotic relation. The real 
measure of rational inquiry is thus not consensus or the resolution of opinion as such, but 
growth or movement towards that end. Put most simply, the ultimate aim of reason and 
argumentation (in their most general sense) ought to be, not consensus as such (which can 
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easily be misconstrued in dangerous ways), but the growth of a community of individuals 
in the broadest, deepest, richest, most truthful senses of those terms.  
 In the course of this conclusion I have made several references to the ideas of 
hope and despair. These are not subsidiary or secondary notions here, introduced solely 
for rhetorical effect. Instead such notions lie at the heart of what it means to be 
reasonable, to be logical. For central to the aim of making the world more reasonable is 
the rational obligation, the logical imperative to never give in to despair. For to despair is 
to lose all hope, and to lose all hope is to give up on reason, to give up on the possibility 
that concrete facts can be brought under the governance of more general, more reasonable 
purposes, aims and ideals. For reason’s proper role or function is to bring compulsive, 
factual conditions under the general guidance or governance of more reasonable 
purposes, aims and ideals for the effective conduct of life. Such aims or ideals include the 
pursuit of what is admirable, what is good, and what is true, for these cover, generally, 
the ultimate aims of all conduct (properly understood). To fulfill its function as a reliable 
and effective aid to conduct, reason must necessarily include within itself the hope that 
compulsive facts can be brought effectively under its direction or guidance. Without this 
hope, reason can have no effective role, no justification for the energies and resources it 
requires. Put most succinctly, without reason there is no hope, and without hope there is 
no reason. Some might protest that this is untrue, that hope can be grounded in something 
other than reason, in justice or tolerance for example, or in play or love. But there is no 
conflict here, no real opposition, for reason as here portrayed is no tyrannical force, no 
totalizing power with colonial aims of oppression and control whose effects would entail 
some deadening conformity or lifeless homogeneity. Such notions rest upon the 
presumption that reality (and with it, reason) is a closed, deductive system where an 
increase in Breadth entails a corresponding decrease in Depth. But if Peirce is right, then 
Breadth and Depth, inclusion and difference, community and individuality, need not 
stand in inverse proportion to each other. If growth in any genuine sense is to be possible 
at all, then Breadth and Depth, inclusion and difference, community and individuality 
must be able to increase conversely. If not, reason and the governing power of norms 
have no real place in the world. For it is only through the possibility of a converse 
increase in Breadth and Depth that things can grow and become more reasonable in any 
ampliative sense. As for the threat of reason becoming a tool of oppression and control, 
these too would be inconsistent with genuinely reasonable aims. For to aim at making the 
world more reasonable necessarily requires recognizing the fallibility, revisability and 
inherently provisional character of all beliefs, however firm and true they might appear. 
This includes the possibility that sometimes the most rational thing to do might be to 
loosen the reins of reason itself. 
 
But in practical affairs, in matters of vital importance, it is very easy to exaggerate the importance 
of ratiocination. Man is so vain in his power of reason! [...] Those whom we are so fond of 
referring to as the “lower animals” reason very little. Now I beg you to observe that those beings 
rarely commit a mistake, while we _____!... The very fact that everybody so ridiculously overrates 
his own reason is sufficient to show how superficial the faculty is. (Peirce 1898, p. 31)  
 
Recognizing the limits of reason does not entail mere subjectivism or relativism, for to 
hold that one’s reason is fallible, that a belief is provisional and revisable does not 
prohibit such a belief from being a legitimate and rationally warranted ground for action. 
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The claims that I am making here, for example, are provisional and fallible and will 
almost inevitably need to be revised and altered as they are subject to more critical 
scrutiny. But though they are provisional, I am also confident enough in them (and that is 
all we need for conduct proper) to submit them for the consideration of others. It is, after 
all, the only reasonable thing to do. 
 
         Link to commentary 
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